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DNA Exonerations and the Elusive Promise of
Criminal Justice Reform
Carissa Byrne Hessick*
WRONGFUL CONVICTIONS AND THE DNA REVOLUTION: TWENTY-FIVE YEARS OF
FREEING THE INNOCENT (Daniel S. Medwed ed., Cambridge University Press
2017)
DNA exonerations have dramatically changed the conversation about the
accuracy of the criminal justice system. Fifty years ago, the widely shared view
was that the system ensured no innocent defendants would be convicted. As Judge
Learned Hand famously complaiQHGFULPLQDOSURFHGXUH³KDVEHHQDOZD\VKDXQWHG
E\WKHJKRVWRIWKHLQQRFHQWPDQFRQYLFWHG,WLVDQXQUHDOGUHDP´1 But hundreds
of DNA exonerations upended that conventional wisdom. They demonstrated that
juries have repeatedly found innocent defendants guilty. If we have, on hundreds
of occasions, convicted innocent people, then how do we correct those errors and
how do we change the criminal justice system to avoid future wrongful
convictions?
These important questions are taken up in Wrongful Convictions and the DNA
Revolution: Twenty-Five Years of Freeing the Innocent,2 a nineteen-chapter
volume, edited by Daniel S. Medwed. The book explores the lessons we have
learned in the twenty-five years since DNA first exonerated a wrongfully
convicted defendant, and it identifies several challenges that still remain. The
book covers a wide array of topics, and it includes chapters from an all-star team of
authors. This breadth and expertise make the volume a good introduction to the
reader who is unfamiliar with DNA exonerations, and it could easily serve as a
textbook for a seminar on the topic.
Wrongful Convictions and the DNA Revolution offers significant detail about
the specific types of errors that resulted in the conviction of innocent defendants.
Those errors include flawed eyewitness identification procedures, coercive and
suggestive interrogation practices, overzealousness on the part of prosecutors, and
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$QQH6KHD5DQVGHOODQG:LOOLDP*DUODQG³%XFN´5DQVGHOO-U'LVWLQJXLVKHG3URIHVVRURI
Law, University of North Carolina School of Law. Many thanks to Andy Hessick and Justin Murray
for their helpful comments on this review essay.
1
United States v. Garsson, 291 F. 646, 649 (S.D.N.Y. 1923).
2
WRONGFUL CONVICTIONS AND THE DNA REVOLUTION: TWENTY-FIVE YEARS OF FREEING
THE INNOCENT (Daniel S. Medwed ed., 2017) [hereinafter WRONGFUL CONVICTIONS AND THE DNA
REVOLUTION].
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poor lawyering by defense attorneys.3 In addition to these specific errors, the
volume also gives great insight into the structural flaws that allowed these errors to
accumulate and persist, such as the incentives for prosecutors to win cases,4 the
incentives for innocent defendants to accept plea bargains,5 the massive caseloads
and chronic underfunding of the criminal justice system,6 the decentralized nature
of the system,7 and the limitations of constitutional litigation for changing the basic
arrangement of how law enforcement and civilians interact.8
Because the volume includes chapters from multiple authors, it provides
different perspectives on important issues. For example, one question that divides
WKHILHOGLVKRZWRGHILQHWKHWHUP³H[RQHUDWLRQ´9 Should the term be reserved for
only those individuals whose innocence have been proven by incontrovertible
'1$HYLGHQFH"2UDUHWKRVHZKRVHFRQYLFWLRQVKDYHEHHQHUDVHG³E\DJRYHUQRU
SURVHFXWRUMXGJHRUMXU\EDVHGRQVRPHQHZHYLGHQFHRIIDFWXDOLQQRFHQFH´DOVR
FRUUHFWO\FODVVLILHGDV³H[RQHUDWHG´"10 The volume presents these opposing views,
and the reader is better served by having both represented.
The presentation of opposing views is not limited to how broadly to define
exoneration. The volume also contains a chapter from Paul Cassell, which asks
difficult questions about the tradeoffs associated with changing the criminal justice
system to make wrongful convictions less likely.11 All changes to the criminal
justice system, including changes that could prevent wrongful convictions, will
involve tradeoffs. For example, changing interrogation techniques to put less
pressure on suspects may reduce the number of innocent defendants who falsely
confess to crimes they did not commit. But it may also reduce the number of
guilty defendants who confess as well.12 :KLOHPRVWRIWKHERRN¶VDXthors appear

3
These are the factors that are most often correlated with a wrongful conviction. See
Brandon L. Garrett, Convicting the Innocent Redux, in WRONGFUL CONVICTIONS AND THE DNA
REVOLUTION, supra note 2, at 40, 45±46.
4
George C. Thomas III, Prosecutors: The Thin Last Line Protecting the Innocents, in
WRONGFUL CONVICTIONS AND THE DNA REVOLUTION, supra note 2, at 208, 210.
5
Id. at 210.
6
Alexandra Natapoff, Negotiating Accuracy: DNA in the Age of Plea Bargaining, in
WRONGFUL CONVICTIONS AND THE DNA REVOLUTION, supra note 2, at 85, 95.
7
Michael Meltsner, Innocence Before DNA, in WRONGFUL CONVICTIONS AND THE DNA
REVOLUTION, supra note 2, at 14, 15.
8
See id.
9
See Daniel S. Medwed, Talking About a Revolution: A Quarter Century of DNA
Exonerations, in WRONGFUL CONVICTIONS AND THE DNA REVOLUTION, supra note 2, at 2, 3 ³7KLV
book takes no universal stance on the most appropriate DQGSUHFLVHGHILQLWLRQRIH[RQHUDWLRQ´ 
10 Richard A. Leo, Has the Innocence Movement Become an Exoneration Movement? The
Risks and Rewards of Redefining Innocence, in WRONGFUL CONVICTIONS AND THE DNA
REVOLUTION, supra note 2, at 57, 60.
11 Paul G. Cassell, Can We Protect the Innocent Without Freeing the Guilty? Thoughts on
Innocence Reforms that Avoid Harmful Trade-Offs, in WRONGFUL CONVICTIONS AND THE DNA
REVOLUTION, supra note 2, at 264.
12 See id. at 275±76.
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to endorse all reforms that might protect the innocent, Cassell unflinchingly asks
whether reforms that prevent conviction of the innocent will also lead to more
acquittals of the guilty.
Although the volume is about DNA exonerations, the contributing authors
emphasize that DNA is only one subplot in the broader story about problems with
accuracy in the criminal justice system. Keith Findley captures this sentiment well
ZKHQ KH VWDWHV ³'1$ ZDV MXVW WKH VWDUW  :KLOH LW DQLPDWHG WKH >,QQRFHQFH]
Movement, it no longer fully defines it. It cannot be the future, at least not the
ZKROHRUHYHQGRPLQDQWSDUWRIWKHIXWXUH´13 Other authors are quick to note that
the nature of DNA evidence necessarily limits DNA exonerations to particular
types of cases,14 and that the increasing availability of DNA tests for law
enforcement is likely to decrease the number of those exonerations going
forward.15 Indeed, a major premise of the book is that we must distill various
lessons from DNA exonerations in order to improve the system for all cases.16
DNA exonerations exposed not simply the limits of former forensic testing, but
also a series of other investigative shortcomings and systemic problems that
contributed to wrongful convictions. Until those other shortcomings and problems
are remedied, the criminal justice system will continue to make inaccurate
determinations about guilt, and innocent people will continue to be jailed for
crimes that they did not commit.
I greatly enjoyed reading suggestions from such a diverse group of wellrespected authors about how to improve the system based on the lessons we have
learned from DNA exonerations. Unsurprisingly, different authors offer different
solutions. Some suggest that the exonerations may have undermined the
constitutionality of capital punishment.17 Others advocate expunging convictions
from the Jim Crow South that were doubtlessly infected by racial bias.18 Others
see DNA exonerations as an opportunity to reform other areas of the law, such as

13

Keith A. Findley, Flawed Science and the New Wave of Innocents, in WRONGFUL
CONVICTIONS AND THE DNA REVOLUTION, supra note 2, at 184, 185.
14 See, e.g., Garrett, supra note 3DW ³>0@RVWFULPLQDOFDVHVKDYHQR'1$WRWHVW´ /HR
supra note 10, DW  ³$Q HVWLPDWHG -90 percent of felony cases do not involve biological
HYLGHQFH´ 
15 See, e.g., Leo, supra QRWH  DW  ³>(@YHQWXDOO\ IRUHQVLF '1$ WHVWLQJ ZLOO EH
FRPPRQSODFHDFURVVWKHFRXQWU\SULRUWRWULDO´ 0HGZHGsupra note 9, at 13 ³'1$WHVWLQJLVQRZ
ubiquitous at the front end of criminal cases, weeding out innocent suspects before cases even go to
WULDO´ 
16 See Medwed, supra note 9, at 3 (³>7@KLVLVDERRNDERXWZKDWZHKDYHOHDUQHGIURPWKHXVH
RI'1$WHFKQRORJ\WRUHPHG\LQGLYLGXDOFDVHVDQGUHIRUPWKHFULPLQDOMXVWLFHV\VWHP´ 
17 Robert J. Smith, G. Ben Cohen & Zoë Robinson, What Does Innocence Have to Do With
Cruel and Unusual Punishment?, in WRONGFUL CONVICTIONS AND THE DNA REVOLUTION, supra
note 2, at 159.
18 Margaret Burnham, Retrospective Justice in the Age of Innocence: The Hard Case of Rape
Executions, in WRONGFUL CONVICTIONS AND THE DNA REVOLUTION, supra note 2, at 291.
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the law of war19 or animal rights,20 or as an opportunity for different types of
clinical education.21
6HYHUDO FKDSWHUV RIIHU VHQVLEOH WDUJHWHG UHIRUPV  .HLWK )LQGOH\¶V FKDSWHU
offers a thoughtful case for targeting arson convictions and other cases involving
junk science.22 $GHOH %HUQKDUG¶V FKDSWHU Rffers a practical improvement on the
legal standard that governs ineffective assistance of counsel claims.23 Rob
:DUGHQ¶V FKDSWHU RQ ZLWQHVV UHFDQWDWLRQV KLJKOLJKWV WKH QHHG WR FKDQJH
prosecutorial practices involving perjury charges.24 And the chapter by Sandra
Guerra Thompson and Robert Wicoff offers important suggestions on how to
respond to systemic criminal justice failures, such as fraud by forensic scientists.25
Despite this collection of thoughtful and practical suggestions for reform, I
finished the volume less optimistic about the chances that significant criminal
justice reform will occur.26 DNA exonerations and the attention they have
received have changed assumptions about the infallibility of the criminal justice
system. Although DNA exonerations have changed public opinion about whether
innocent defendants are convicted, that change in opinion has not led to a
³UHYROXWLRQ´ LQ WKH FULPLQDO MXVWLFH V\VWHP  /DUJH VHJPHQWV RI WKH SXEOLF QRZ
recognize that innocent defendants are convicted with some regularity,27 but
society does not seem willing to do much to avoid convicting more innocents in
the future.


19

Erik Luna, Innocence at War, in WRONGFUL CONVICTIONS AND THE DNA REVOLUTION,
supra note 2, at 379.
20 Justin F. Marceau & Steven M. Wise, Exonerating the Innocent: Habeas for Nonhuman
Animals, in WRONGFUL CONVICTIONS AND THE DNA REVOLUTION, supra note 2, at 334.
21 Jacqueline McMurtrie, A Tale of Two Innocence Clinics: Client Representation and
Legislative Advocacy, in WRONGFUL CONVICTIONS AND THE DNA REVOLUTION, supra note 2, at 117.
22 See Findley, supra note 133.
23 Adele Bernhard, Ineffective Assistance of Counsel and the Innocence Revolution: A
Standards-Based Approach, in WRONGFUL CONVICTIONS AND THE DNA REVOLUTION, supra note 2, at
226, 235±40.
24 Rob Warden, Reacting to Recantations, in WRONGFUL CONVICTIONS AND THE DNA
REVOLUTION, supra note 2, at 106.
25 Sandra Guerra Thompson & Robert Wicoff, Outbreaks of Injustice: Responding to
Systemic Irregularities in the Criminal Justice System, in WRONGFUL CONVICTIONS AND THE DNA
REVOLUTION, supra note 2, at 314.
26 To be clear, I am less optimistic about significant reforms that will protect the innocent
from conviction. There are also other reforms that the criminal justice system should undertake,
including reforms that would address racial disparity within the system and disproportionately high
levels of incarceration in this country. Those reforms are beyond the scope of this essay.
27 Marvin Zalman, Matthew J. Larson & Brad Smith, Citizens’ Attitudes Toward Wrongful
Convictions, 37 CRIM. JUST. REV. 51, 57 (2012) (reporting that a quarter of survey respondents
EHOLHYHG WKDW ZURQJIXO FRQYLFWLRQV RFFXUUHG RQO\ ³YHU\ UDUHO\´ ZKLOH WKH RWKHU WKUHH-quarters
UHVSRQGHGWKDWZURQJIXOFRQYLFWLRQVRFFXUUHGHLWKHU³RFFDVLRQDOO\´RU³IUHTXHQWO\´ 
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Stephanie Roberts Hartung illustrates this problem in her chapter on postconviction procedure.28 Hartung complains that, as compared to improvements
that have been made in the pretrial and trial context, very few reforms have
occurred in the post-conviction realm.29 But reading through the pretrial and trial
reforms she identified,30 one wonders whether Hartung could have set a lower bar.
Take eyewitness identification, which has been identified as a leading factor
present in cases of wrongful conviction.31 Despite widespread recognition of the
unreliability of prevailing practices, and despite national guidelines promulgated
by the National Institute of Justice in 1999, only ten states have reformed police
lineup procedures.32 Interrogation procedures have not fared much better. Despite
the prevalence of false confessions resulting from coercive and suggestive
interrogation procedures, fewer than twenty states have required law enforcement
to videotape interrogations.33
Hartung is not the only author who highlights how little progress has been
made. Adele Bernhard’s chapter on defense attorneys also paints a bleak picture.34
As she notes, “the DNA exoneration dataset show[s] that poor defense lawyering is
a major factor in the conviction of the innocent.”35 Yet despite the increased
attention to both wrongful convictions and poor defense lawyering in the wake of
the DNA revolution, little has changed. Indigent defense is still shamefully
underfunded,36 and the quality of defense representation remains poor.37 And, as
Bernhard demonstrates, the courts have continued to apply exactingly high
standards of review to ineffective assistance claims. So even though judges now
know for certain that an ineffective defense attorney can significantly increase the
chances of an innocent person being convicted, those judges are still unlikely to
grant a new trial to a defendant with a hopelessly bad lawyer.38 As a solution,

28 Stephanie Roberts Hartung, Post-Conviction Procedure: The Next Frontier in Innocence
Reform, in WRONGFUL CONVICTIONS AND THE DNA REVOLUTION, supra note 2, at 247.
29 Id.
30 See id. at 248–50.
31 Garrett, supra note 3, at 46. See also BRANDON L. GARRETT, CONVICTING THE INNOCENT:
WHERE CRIMINAL PROSECUTIONS GO WRONG 9, 48 (2011) (reporting that 76% of a large dataset of
exonerated defendants had been misidentified by eyewitnesses).
32 Hartung, supra note 28, at 249. Local law enforcement agencies appear to have made at
least some progress, albeit at a slow pace. But Hartung reports that fewer than half of all departments
have made any of the reforms suggested by the NIJ. Id.
33 Id. at 249–50.
34 See Bernhard, supra note 23.
35 Id. at 226.
36 See, e.g., AM. BAR ASS’N, GIDEON’S BROKEN PROMISE: AMERICA’S CONTINUING QUEST FOR
EQUAL JUSTICE 17–18, 38 (2004).
37 See id. at 14–17, 39.
38 See Bernhard, supra note 23, at 231–35 (concluding, after a study of ineffective assistance
claims, that “[w]hatever concerns the federal courts may have about wrongly convicting innocent
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Bernhard suggests that, rather than trying to craft an ineffective assistance standard
that is primarily concerned with preserving flexibility and autonomy for defense
counsel, courts should instead adopt a checklist approach to representation.39 That
our current ineffective assistance doctrine is incapable of capturing those lawyers
ZKRVH UHSUHVHQWDWLRQ LQFOXGHV D IDLOXUH WR SHUIRUP ³EDVLF WDVNV´40 shows how
meaningless our current legal standards are. And it is a sad illustration of the fact
that the judiciary has, for decades, failed to demand more from members of the
bar.
*HRUJH 7KRPDV¶V FKDSWHU RQ SURVHFXWRUV GRHV QRW LQVWLOO FRQILGHQFH LQ WKH
other side of the adversarial system. Thomas conducted a study of the impact of
prosecutorial errors on wrongful convictions.41 +HIRXQGPDQ\FDVHVRI³REYLRXV
SURVHFXWRULDORYHUUHDFKLQJ´EXWKHDOVRIRXQGSOHQW\RIFDVHVLQYROYLQJ³URXWLQH
PLVWDNHV WKDW FRQGHPQ LQQRFHQW GHIHQGDQWV WR \HDUV LQ SULVRQ´42 One innocent
defendant spent 15 years in prison because the state could not keep track of
evidence.43 Thomas suggests that these latter cases were more depressing than the
cases of affirmative prosecutorial conduct.44 I agree.
These examples of incompetence are so disheartening because they expose
the negligence and incompetence that many of us suspect is all too common in the
criminal justice system. No one thinks that such incompetence is acceptable. And
yet, the courts have repeatedly excused such incompetence rather than creating
incentives for law enforcement to hold themselves to higher standards.45
Incompetence, whether systemic or occasional, will obviously undermine the
FULPLQDO MXVWLFH V\VWHP¶V DELOLW\ WR DFFXUDWHO\ VRUW WKH JXLOW\ IURP WKH LQQRFHQW

people, those concerns are QRWSURPSWLQJPRUHIHGHUDOUHYHUVDOVRIVWDWHFRQYLFWLRQVIRUVWDWHFRXUWV¶
PLVDSSOLFDWLRQRIWKH6L[WK$PHQGPHQWULJKWWRHIIHFWLYHDVVLVWDQFHRIFRXQVHO´ 
39 Id. at 235±40.
40 Id. at 236, 239.
41 See Thomas, supra note 4.
42 Id. at 213.
43 The defendant spent ten years in prison before persuading a court that a DNA test was
necessary; then he spent another fifteen years in prison waiting for the sheriff to find the evidence.
Id.
44 ³, VKRXOG ZDUQ WKDW UHDGLQg these summaries [of a random sample of cases from the
([RQHUDWLRQ 5HJLVWU\ GDWDEDVH@ LV D GHSUHVVLQJ SURMHFW  ,W¶V QRW MXVW RU PD\EH QRW HVSHFLDOO\ WKH
cases of overreaching that are depressing but the kind of routine mistakes that condemn innocent
deIHQGDQWVWR\HDUVLQSULVRQ´Id.
45 The Court has declined to create incentives for police officers to know the content of the
criminal law, see Heien v. North Carolina, 135 S. Ct. 530, 534 (2014) (holding that the Fourth
Amendment does not forbid seizurHVEDVHGRQDSROLFHRIILFHU¶VPLVWDNHQXQGHUVWDQGLQJRIWKHODZ 
incentives to maintain accurate warrants database, see Herring v. United States, 555 U.S. 135, 144
(2009) (refusing to exclude evidence obtained as a result of an arrest based on an invalid warrant that
had not been removed from a law enforcement database), or incentives for prosecutors to train their
attorneys on what evidence disclosures are constitutionally required, see Connick v. Thompson, 563
U.S. 51, 54 (2011) (holding that prior, unrelated Brady violations did not create a duty for elected
district attorney to conduct further training of line prosecutors).
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Without more resources and better incentives, such incompetence is likely to
continue.
3DXO&DVVHOO¶VFKDSWHURQWUDGHRIIVDOVRKLJKOLJKWVWKHSUHVVLQJQHHGIRUPRUH
UHVRXUFHV$VKHQRWHVWKH³URRWFDXVHRIZURQJIXOFRQYLFWLRQVLVDOPRVWFHUWDLQO\
insufficient resRXUFHVGHYRWHGWRWKHFULPLQDOMXVWLFHV\VWHP´46 But the chances of
more resources being devoted to the criminal justice system²especially on the
front end, rather than toward corrections²are, as Cassell notes, quite slim.47
Cassell makes a strong case that, in a system with severely constrained
resources, vindicating constitutional rights comes at the expense of protecting the
innocent from conviction.48 Defense attorneys with limited time and resources will
prioritize a suppression motion above a rigorous factual investigation, and
legislatures eager to stem the tide of constitutional litigation will limit postconviction review that could free the innocent. Cassell thus argues that the
V\VWHP¶VOLPLWHGUHVRXUFHVVKRXOGEHIRFXVHGWRZDUGVGLVFRYHULQJDQGvindicating
claims of factual innocence. Specifically, he suggests shifting resources away
from litigating Fourth Amendment exclusionary claims, Miranda claims, and postconviction claims of a purely legal nature.49 All of these claims involve
vindicating GHIHQGDQWV¶FRQVWLWXWLRQDOULJKWVUDWKHUWKDQLPSURYLQJDFFXUDF\
(VSHFLDOO\ LQ D YROXPH GHYRWHG WR '1$ H[RQHUDWLRQV &DVVHOO¶V GHFLVLRQ WR
prioritize the innocent seems intuitively correct. But the nature of this choice
should not be sugar-coated: it trades rights and values ordinarily associated with
justice in order to have more resources to devote to the pursuit of truth. Can such a
system legitimately call itself a criminal justice system?
2QHUHDVRQWKDW&DVVHOO¶VSULRULWL]DWLRQRILQQRFHQFHRYHUFonstitutional rights
seems correct is that our criminal justice system exists in order to sort the guilty
from the innocent. But this foundational premise²that the system exists to sort
the innocent from the guilty²takes a serious beating in the chapter by Alexandra
Natapoff.50 $V1DWDSRIIWHOOVXV³>W@KHYDVWEXONRIWKH86FULPLQDOV\VWHPLVQRW
engaged in a quest for accuracy based on evidence in the first instance. Instead, it
is engaged in bargaining. The plea bargaining process has turned evidence and
DFFXUDF\LQWRFRPPRGLWLHVWKDWDUHWUDGHGDQGQHJRWLDWHG´51 1DWDSRII¶VIUDQN
discussion is not simply a commentary on plea bargaining or on the limits of
forensic evidence. It is a commentary on the modern criminal justice system. To

46

Cassell, supra note 11, at 273.
Id. at 274.
48 Id. at 273±74.
49 Id. at 272±77. Cassell also suggests that defense counsel attempt to ascertain which of their
clients are actually innocent, and to focus their efforts on those clients. Id. at 277±80. This
suggestion also prioritizes innocence over constitutional rights, as it would decrease the assistance of
counsel for the guilty in order to provide more assistance to the innocent.
50 See Natapoff, supra note 6.
51 Id. at 86.
47
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understand this commentary, it is important to take a step back and consider how
plea bargaining operates.
Plea bargaining allows the state to impose punishment without having to incur
the time and expense associated with trial. The system works well for guilty
defendants who would likely be convicted at trial. Those defendants receive a
shorter sentence in return for waiving their right to a trial. And the system has
ensured that most guilty defendants will gladly plead rather than proceed to trial.
Legislatures routinely increase the punishment associated with conviction at trial
so that prosecutors have leverage to induce guilty pleas.52 Indeed, legislatures
often enact criminal statutes based on an explicit assumption that the parties will
plea bargain. For example, in the recent debates over whether to lessen mandatory
minimum sentences for drug offenders, reform opponents argued that it was
necessary to maintain current penalties, not because they represented appropriate
punishments, but rather so that prosecutors could use those penalties as leverage to
obtain guilty pleas.53 This arrangement has proven quite effective. Currently,
nearly ninety-five percent of convictions are the result of guilty pleas, rather than
trials.54
But the quest for efficiency in the modern criminal justice system does not
target only the guilty defendants. Innocent defendants face the same harsh laws
and the same plea bargaining dynamics. Imagine, for example, an innocent
defendant who has been indicted for committing a crime that carries a penalty of
five years imprisonment. Prosecutors do not simply indict random people, so there
is at least some evidence suggesting that the defendant committed the crime.
Unless she can produce enough evidence of her innocence to convince the
prosecutor to drop the charges, a defendant must choose whether to proceed to trial
or accept a plea bargain. The rational decision will depend on the chances that she

52 See Gerard E. Lynch, Screening Versus Plea Bargaining: Exactly What Are We Trading
Off?, 55 STAN. L. REV. 1399, 1401±02 (2003).
53 Senator Chuck Grassley opposed legislation that would have reduced 20-year, 10-year, and
five-year mandatory minimums for drug offenses to 10 years, five years, and two years, respectively.
He justified his opposition, in part, on the fact that prosecutors were not seeking those penalties in all
cases, and so the sentences were, on average, appropriate. He noted that:
[J]ust under half of all drug courier offenders were subject to mandatory minimum
sentences, but under 10 percent were subject to mandatory minimum sentences at the
time of their sentencing.
...
That is an intended goal of current Federal sentencing policy, to put pressure on
defendants to cooperate in exchange for a lower sentence so evidence against more
responsible criminals can be attained. As a result, even for drug couriers the average
sentence is 39 months. That seems to be an appropriate level.
161 CONG. REC. S963 (daily ed. Feb. 12, 2015) (statement of Sen. Grassley).
54 /DIOHUY&RRSHU86   ³1LQHW\-seven percent of federal convictions
and ninety-IRXUSHUFHQWRIVWDWHFRQYLFWLRQVDUHWKHUHVXOWRIJXLOW\SOHDV´ ; Padilla v. Kentucky, 559
U.S. 356, 372 (2010) (citing BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEPT. OF JUSTICE, SOURCEBOOK OF
CRIMINAL JUSTICE STATISTICS 2003, at 418 tbl.5.17, 450 tbl.5.46 (31st ed. 2005)) ³Pleas account for
QHDUO\RIDOOFULPLQDOFRQYLFWLRQV´ 
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will be convicted and the bargain that the prosecutor is offering. If she estimates
that she has an 80% chance of acquittal at trial, she should accept any plea bargain
that offers her less than one year in prison.55
7REHFOHDU1DWDSRII¶VFRQWULEXWLRQKHUHLVQRWWRLGHQWLI\WKHSUHYDOHQFHRI
plea bargaining or the values that underlie it. The centrality of plea bargaining is
well recognized by both criminal justice actors56 and those who study the system.57
,QVWHDG1DWDSRII¶VPDMRUFRQWULEXWLRQLVKHUMX[WDSRVLWLRQRISOHDEDUJDLQLQJZLWK
DNA exonerations. That juxtaposition left me pondering whether the very concept
of exonerations is out of place in the modern criminal justice system long after I
finished reading the volume.
1DWDSRII¶VMX[WDSRVLWLRQRISOHDEDUJDLQLQJZLWK'1$H[RQHUDWLRQVKLJKOLJKWV
the false promise of reforming the system in light of the lessons learned from DNA
exonerations. DNA exonerations captured the attention of the public because they
GHPRQVWUDWH³WKH$PHULFDQFULPLQDOMXVWLFHV\VWHP¶VLQDELOLW\WRSHUIRUPLWVPRVW
basic function²separating the innocenWIURPWKHJXLOW\´58 %XW1DWDSRII¶VFKDSWHU
reminds us that we have largely abandoned that basic function of the system. Ours
is now a system of plea bargains rather than a system of trials.59 Plea bargaining
³FRPPRGLILHVDQGWUDGHVDZD\DFFXUDF\´IRUHIficiency.60 Plea bargaining puts a
price tag on sorting the innocent from the guilty, and it makes that price too high
for most defendants. The implicit message of plea bargaining is that, because trials
are expensive, we should avoid them, even at the cost of convicting innocent
defendants.

55 The rational actor model tells us that the defendant would want to accept this bargain
because it represents the expected punishment²WKH³SURGXFWRIWKHSUREDELOLW\RIFRQYLFWLRQDQGWKH
DQWLFLSDWHG VHQWHQFH XSRQ FRQYLFWLRQ DW WULDO´  -HQQLIHU ) 5HLQJDQXP Plea Bargaining and
Prosecutorial Discretion, 78 AM. ECON. REV. 713, 714 (1988). For more on plea bargaining and the
rational actor model, see Rebecca Hollander-Blumoff, Social Psychology, Information Processing,
and Plea Bargaining, 91 MARQ. L. REV. 163 (2007) (describing the rational actor paradigm in plea
bargaining and explaining why it may not capture the reality of the negotiation between prosecutor
and defense counsel).
56 See, e.g., Missouri v. Frye, 566 U.S. 134, 144 (2012) (quoting Robert E. Scott & William J.
Stuntz, Plea Bargaining as Contract, 101 YALE L.J.    VWDWLQJWKDW³SOHDEDUJDLQLQJ
. . . is not some adjunct to the criminal justice system; it is WKHFULPLQDOMXVWLFHV\VWHP´ ; Santobello
v. New York, 404 U.S. 257, 260 (1971) ³The disposition of criminal charges by agreement between
WKHSURVHFXWRUDQGWKHDFFXVHGVRPHWLPHVORRVHO\FDOOHGµSOHDEDUJDLQLQJ¶LVDQHVVHQWLDOFRPSRQHQW
RIWKHDGPLQLVWUDWLRQRIMXVWLFH´ 
57 See, e.g., Albert W. Alschuler, The Changing Plea Bargaining Debate, 69 CALIF. L. REV.
652 (1981); Stephanos Bibas, Regulating the Plea-Bargaining Market: From Caveat Emptor to
Consumer Protection, 99 CALIF. L. REV. 1117, 1138 (2011); Stephen J. Schulhofer, Plea Bargaining
as Disaster, 101 YALE L.J. 1979 (1992); William J. Stuntz, Plea Bargaining and Criminal Law’s
Disappearing Shadow, 117 HARV. L. REV. 2548 (2004); Ronald F. Wright, Trial Distortion and the
End of Innocence in Federal Criminal Justice, 154 U. PA. L. REV. 79 (2005).
58 Leo, supra note 10, at 59.
59 See Bibas, supra note 57DW ³Plea bargaining is no longer a negligible exception to
WKHQRUPRIWULDOVLWLVWKHQRUP´ 
60 Natapoff, supra note 6, at 87.
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In contrast to the message of plea bargaining, the message in the wake of the
DNA exonerations is that we may be able to improve the ability of our system to
sort the innocent from the guilty. Implicit in this hope of improving our ability to
VRUW WKH LQQRFHQW IURP WKH JXLOW\ LV ³WKH QRWLRQ WKDW RXU FULPLQDO V\VWHP LV
SULPDULO\FRPPLWWHGWRDFFXUDF\LQWKHILUVWLQVWDQFH´61 But the prevalence of plea
bargaining and the dynamics that have made trial an unaffordable luxury for even
innocent defendants tell us the opposite. They show that our desire for efficiency
has supplanted the original goal of the criminal justice system²to punish the
guilty while protecting the innocent.62
1DWDSRII¶V FULWLTXH RI WKH FULPLQDO MXVWLFe system and the ability of DNA
exonerations to improve the system is not limited to plea bargaining. She also
points to misdemeanor prosecutions²which vastly outnumber felony
prosecutions63²as further proof that our system cares more about shuffling people
through the system than using the system to seek the truth.64 The misdemeanor
system regularly uses pretrial detention to coerce pleas on charges that would have
resulted in little or no jail time had the defendant been convicted at trial.65 And
when defense attorneys do attempt to litigate in misdemeanor courts, some judges
are openly hostile to their efforts. Natapoff recounts the experience of Eve
Brensike Primus, a defense attorney turned law professor, who was told by a judge

61

Id. at 97.
I am, of course, hardly the first to make these observations about efficiency and market
forces. Stephanos Bibas, for example, has criticized the free market defense of plea bargaining
RIIHUHGE\PDQ\DFDGHPLFVQRWLQJWKDW³>Q@RWDOORIHWKLFVERLOVGRZQWRZHLJKLQJFRQVHTXHQFHVDQd
PD[LPL]LQJWKHDFWRUV¶SUHIHUHQFHV´ STEPHANOS BIBAS, THE MACHINERY OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE 63
   'DUU\O %URZQ GHPRQVWUDWHV WKDW ³WKH VXFFHVV RI PDUNHW PHFKDQLVPV DQG PDUNHW-inspired
QRUPV´H[WHQGVEH\RQGSOHDEDUJDLQLQJWRRWKHUDUHDVRIFULPLQDOSURFHGXUHDQGWKDWDOWKRXJK³WKH
PRGHO RI PDUNHWV´ ZDV ³LQWHQGHG WR OLPLW WKH VWDWH´ LW KDV LQVWHDG DOORZHG ³VWDWH HQIRUFHPHQW
FDSDFLW\>WR@WKULYH>@´DARRYL K. BROWN, FREE MARKET CRIMINAL JUSTICE: HOW DEMOCRACY AND
LAISSEZ FAIRE UNDERMINE THE RULE OF LAW 63, 66 (2016). As to the efficiency value, many have
noted that prioritizing efficiency in the criminal justice system is both troubling and pernicious. See,
e.g., BIBAS, supraDW ³$V\VWHPOHVVREVHVVHGZLWKHIILFLHQF\ZRXOGVORZGRZQWRWDNHDFOoser
ORRNDWWKHVHFDVHV>EHFDXVH@WKHLQHIILFLHQWVDIHJXDUGVRIWULDOPLJKWFDWFKVRPHRIWKHVHLQMXVWLFHV´ 
63 See Alexandra Natapoff, Misdemeanors, 85 S. CAL. L. REV. 1313, 1314±15 (2012) (noting
WKDW³>D@SSUR[LPDWHO\RQHPLOOLRQIHORQ\FRQYLFWLRQVDUHHQWHUHGLQWKH86HDFK\HDU´ZKLOH³>D@Q
HVWLPDWHGWHQPLOOLRQPLVGHPHDQRUFDVHVDUHILOHGDQQXDOO\´ 
64 Natapoff, supra note 6, at 94±96. See also Alexandra Natapoff, Misdemeanors, 11 ANN.
REV. L. & SOC. SCI.    ³>0@DQ\ORZHUFRXUWVUXVKLQGLJHQWGHIHQGDQWVWKURXJKLQEXON
earning nicknames such as cattle herding, assembly-OLQHSURFHVVLQJDQG0F-XVWLFH´ 
65 Natapoff, supra note 6, at 95. See also Paul Heaton, Sandra Mayson & Megan Stevenson,
The Downstream Consequences of Misdemeanor Pretrial Detention, 69 STAN. L. REV. 711, 747, 771
(2017) (reporting that misdemeanor defendants who are detained pretrial are more likely to be
convicted and more likely to receive sentences of jaiO WLPH ³ RI WKH GHWDLQHG PLVGHPHDQRU
defendants . . . who pleaded guilty would not have been convicted at all had they been released
SUHWULDO´GHWDLQHGGHIHQGDQWV³KDYHHVVHQWLDOO\DFFXPXODWHGFUHGLWVWRZDUGDILQDOVHQWHQFHRIMDLODV
a result of their detention and are therefore more likely to accede to and receive sentences of
LPSULVRQPHQW´ .
62
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to save her substantive arguments for appeal.66 Natapoff also recounts how
misdemeanor defendants have, on numerous occasions, been convicted for
innocuous conduct that appellate courts had previously held not to be illegal.67
Whatever modest reforms DNA exonerations have prompted are nowhere to
be seen in either plea bargaining dynamics or the misdemeanor system. Nor is
there much hope that the exonerations will change these systems in the future.
DNA is simply not an issue in the vast majority of cases.68 And even if DNA
exonerations were to change investigative techniques, such as eyewitness
identifications and interrogation procedures, those techniques often are not
employed in misdemeanor cases. Loitering, trespassing, and other common
misdemeanors rely only on police observation, rather than investigative
techniques.69
DNA testing is unlikely to have much effect on plea bargaining either. Some
(though notably not all) states permit defendants who pleaded guilty to obtain postconviction DNA testing.70 But the essentially unlimited bargaining power given to
prosecutors allows them to easily circumvent these post-conviction safeguards.
3URVHFXWRUV FDQ FRQGLWLRQ D SOHD EDUJDLQ RQ D GHIHQGDQW¶V ZDLYHU RI KHU ULJKW WR
DNA testing,71 and they can also require defendants to waive any rights to appeal
or to otherwise challenge their convictions.72 There are plenty of examples of
innocent defendants who have pleaded guilty rather than wait for DNA testing
because prosecutors refused to keep the plea bargain offer open until the tests came
back and defendants knew the results might be inconclusive.73
Wrongful Convictions and the DNA Revolution: Twenty-Five Years of Freeing
the Innocent is an ambitious and important book. It not only provides a thorough
and nuanced overview of DNA exonerations, it also challenges the reader to

66 Natapoff, supra note 6, at 95 (citing Eve Brensike Primus, Our Broken Misdemeanor
Justice System: Its Problems and Some Potential Solutions, 85 S. CAL. L. REV. POSTSCRIPT 80, 81
(2012)).
67 Natapoff, supra note 6, at 95±96.
68 See supra note 14 and accompanying text.
69 ³[U]nlike serious offenses of burglary, rape or hRPLFLGHWKHµHYLGHQFH¶RIDPLVGHPHDQRU
GHIHQGDQW¶V JXLOW ZLOO RIWHQ EH QR PRUH WKDQ D SROLFH RIILFHU¶V DVVHUWLRQ RI ORLWHULQJ WUHVSDVVLQJ
VSHHGLQJ KDQGLQJ VRPHWKLQJ WR VRPHRQH HOVH DFWLQJ DV D QXLVDQFH RU RWKHU EHKDYLRU´  1DWDSRII
supra note 63, at 1346.
70 See Samuel R. Wiseman, Waiving Innocence, 96 MINN. L. REV. 952, 955 n.14 (2012)
³$SSUR[LPDWHO\ILIWHHQVWDWXWHVFXUUHQWO\GHQ\'1$WHVWLQJWRGHIHQGDQWVZKRSOHDGHGJXLOW\´ 
71
See id. at 958 (documenting DNA waivers and noting that, if challenged, courts are likely
to uphold such waivers).
72 See Susan R. Klein, Aleza S. Remis & Donna Lee Elm, Waiving the Criminal Justice
System: An Empirical and Constitutional Analysis, 52 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 73, 92 (2015) (conducted
VWXG\ HVWDEOLVKLQJ WKDW ³D VLJQLILFDQW QXPEHU RI SURVHFXWRUV VHHN ZDLYHUV RI DOO VWDWXWRU\ DQG
constitutional claims regardless of whether such violations occurred pre-trial, during the entry of a
guilty plea, at the sentencing hearingRUWKHUHDIWHU´ 
73 See, e.g., Buffey v. Ballard, 236 W. Va. 509 (2015).
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consider whether real criminal justice reform is possible. While some chapters
take an optimistic approach to the question of reform, others paint a much more
troubling picture. To be clear, the pessimistic messages in these chapters by
Hartung, Bernhard, Thomas, Cassell, and Natapoff are a reason to read this
volume, not a reason to avoid it. Those who wish to educate themselves about the
criminal justice system will invariably learn things that are discomforting. Our
system is far from perfect, and there are many reasons that reform has repeatedly
stalled.
Indeed, that reform remains elusive may be one of the most important lessons
that we can learn from DNA exonerations. Those exonerations upended the
conventional wisdom about the accuracy of the criminal justice system, proving
that our system has repeatedly failed to sort the innocent from the guilty, and
highlighting various features of the current system that almost certainly impair
accurate determinations of guilt in cases without DNA evidence. But changing
public opinion about the fallibility of the criminal justice system has not been
HQRXJKWRVWDUWDWUXH³UHYROXWLRQ´7KHUHZLOOEHQRUHYROXWLRQXQWLO DQGXQOHVV 
we demand investigative changes from law enforcement, ensure effective
assistance from defense attorneys, refuse to tolerate incompetence and inattention
from prosecutors, devote more resources to criminal justice, and renounce
efficiency as the driving value in criminal cases.

